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Brazil-from the South. Initially these Southern producers argued that biofuels from the South were better for the environment than those from the North. However, the backlash against biofuels since the 2007 food crisis appears to have led these producers to ally themselves more closely with their developed country counterparts. The future of the global biofuel industry is uncertain as oil prices fluctuate, as the financial crisis overshadows environmental concerns, and as many states and non-governmental organisations consequently take a more cautious stance. The expectation of high market growth for biofuels from EU countries, driven by their early commitments to renewable energy quotas, has been tempered by concerns about the environmental and food security impacts and coupled with the requirement for sustainability criteria for biofuels. As a result, future demand for biofuels might be more likely to come from developing countries with rapidly growing energy needs, such as China. These countries may have less interest in demanding the sustainability criteria required by the EU as immediate development needs eclipse environmental considerations.
Given these new and still-uncertain trends in markets and production chains, this article explores what the growing controversy over the potential value of biofuels tells us about the changing dynamics of the South-South political economy of environmental change. We divide it into four sections.
We begin by explaining the surge-then the backlash beginning in 2007-in political support for biofuels over the past decade. We suggest that the environmental and food security positions towards biofuels are influenced by countries' positions as (potential) producers and consumers and reflect their strategic decisions to promote economic opportunities. Next, we offer a brief survey of recent work on the new global political architecture, particularly with respect to emerging relationships among Southern countries. In light of this, we assess the shift in partnerships to promote and support biofuels. Third, to illustrate the potential consequences of bigger biofuel markets, we analyse Indonesia's oil palm industry. Indonesia and Malaysia are now exploring ways to use palm oil, already in high demand from the food industry, as a biodiesel feedstock. We evaluate the potential environmental effects of further pressure for oil palm plantations by considering the well studied current effects of the industry on tropical forests and the likelihood that biofuel consumers will demand changes in these production processes. We then develop our main argument: that, out of this growing thicket of controversy, uncertainty and diversity, biofuel producers in the South look set to repeat and promote the already-existing exploitative and destructive patterns observed in other agricultural industries. Despite the positive environmental potential of some biofuels, given the support from current Northern and Southern producers and multinational corporations (MNCs), and with consumer demand rising primarily in Southern countries, sustainability is not likely to be the driving force in-or the outcome of-biofuel development.
The rise and fall of the biofuel 'solution'
The surge of enthusiasm and the subsequent pull-back in interest sets the stage for understanding the emerging partnerships for developing and promoting biofuels. The early stages of biofuel development provide particular insight into the economic and political interests of certain countries and regions-especially Brazil, the USA and the EU-in biofuels.
Experiments and research on biofuels were ongoing throughout the 20th century. Brazil in particular chose to invest considerable resources in biofuels.
1 Nevertheless, the global shift towards more ambitious policies to develop biofuels-and the corresponding emergence of stronger markets for biofuels-did not occur until interest in the USA and the EU took off in the late 1990s. This interest arose in part out of the influential language around climate change mitigation, domestic energy security and oil resource depletion. Biofuels were also attractive because they offered the possibility of solving several problems without fundamental changes to lifestyles in the North: biofuels required a shift to a new form of fuel, not a shift in patterns of consumption or economic growth.
A convergence of powerful economic and environmental lobby groups (notably firms in agricultural sectors and climate change activists) also helped the biofuel industry to gain ground against the oil industry and, to some extent, even get the latter on board, with companies like Shell investing in biofuels. A confluence of economic and political factors kept the reaction to biofuels primarily positive until 2006. Strong agricultural lobbies, including US corn and German rapeseed producers (already highly subsidised), were interested in new markets. National security departments were intrigued by the possibility of reducing dependence on foreign oil (particularly from the Middle East in the wake of 9/11). And climate change activists were hoping to promote alternatives to fossil fuels. Moreover, some environmental advocates felt that mandated biofuel targets would spur efforts to move from primary biofuels (for example, ethanol and diesel produced from crops like corn, sugarcane and rapeseed) to secondary biofuels (for example, ligno-cellulosic ethanol produced from crop waste and non-food crops). Even those concerned about possible spill-over effects-where, for example, fields with crops for food are converted to produce biofuels instead, or where more states allow the use of genetically modified crops to increase biofuel yields-saw significant environmental and social benefits from at least some of the biofuels and, despite reservations, were not ready to organise large-scale resistance to something with so much potential to do good.
The biofuel food riots of 2007
The 2007 food crisis, with riots in Haiti, Yemen and Zimbabwe, among other countries, unexpectedly put biofuels under an intense media spotlight. Some journalists were calling these 'food' riots, while others labelled them 'fuel' riots, attributing the rising prices of staple crops (such as rice, wheat and corn) to causes ranging from biofuels to high oil prices to market speculation in food commodities. 6 Suddenly the biofuels industry was mired in controversy and bad press. With estimates of the impact of biofuels on food prices varying wildly, from a low of 2%-3% suggested by the Bush administration to a high of 75% in a draft of a World Bank report (which became international news after the Guardian published it), 7 the EU pulled back on its biofuel targets. The EU also postponed initial deadlines for decisions on renewable energy requirements. Further talks led to modified targets: legislation adopted in April 2009 established that renewables would account for 20% of the EU's energy by 2020, and set out greenhouse gas emission savings as well as sustainability criteria required for biofuels to be counted towards meeting this target.
In the EU the food crisis provided an opening for some countries to shift from quiet noncompliance to vocal opposition to biofuel targets. In part the discord in the EU appears to be linked to domestic political economies, with countries with the highest potential to produce biofuels tending to advocate strongly (Germany, France and the Netherlands, specifically, although they emphasise sustainable biofuels and not all support mandated targets), while those with little production capacity have been silent or actively opposed to the biofuel targets (particularly Malta, although also, to varying degrees, Greece, Italy, the UK and Spain, who have been reluctant or uncertain adopters of biofuel directives). Biofuel debates in the EU are also shaped by concerns about agricultural subsidies, which have been under attack in the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings (particularly in the still-unresolved Doha Round).
Countries that would have to import biofuels to meet the proposed EU-mandated targets tend to frame their opposition to the directive through the lens of food security concerns, and thus have an opportunity to avoid consenting to a costly regional policy without appearing to balk at environmental action.
The environmental benefits of biofuels came into even greater question as scientific studies raised doubt as to their true carbon footprint. Two 2008 articles in the journal Science were particularly damning. In a review of research on 26 different biofuels, 12-including corn ethanol from the USA, sugarcane ethanol from Brazil and palm oil diesel from Malaysia-were found to have greater aggregate environmental costs than fossil fuels. 8 In the second article authors from The Nature Conservancy and the University of Minnesota found that biofuels derived from food crops in the USA, Brazil and Southeast Asia yielded a 'biofuel carbon debt' of 17-420 times the carbon saved by not using fossil fuels. 9
However, less support for biofuels in Europe-and consequent policy and market uncertaintyhas not stifled all global interest. In the next section, we evaluate the shift in partnerships to support biofuels, and argue that these illustrate a new political and economic role for a set of rapidly developing countries. To do this, we first offer a brief survey of recent work on the new global political architecture, particularly with respect to emerging relationships among Southern countries, and then consider these relationships in the biofuel sector.
A changing global architecture-South-South trade and North-South partnerships
Global trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns suggest that Third World consumer markets are becoming more significant for Third World producers, and indicate that a new era of South-South trade is distancing the global South from the unidirectional economic hold of the North. The pull-back from the EU and some others on biofuel mandates may not remove the incentives for developing countries to move forward on biofuels, as the growing demand for energy in emerging Southern economies has the potential to finance the industry.
Emerging economies, and Brazil in particular, are adopting new roles in biofuel investments and development. These emerging economies include, according to different analysts, Brazil, Russia, India and China (the 'BRIC' countries), South Africa, the ASEAN-4 countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines), and Mexico (together making up 'BRICSAM'). 10
Some characterise the new dynamics as a shift from North-South relations to interactions among the 'three worlds' of developed countries, emerging economies and the remaining highly diverse 'Third World' developing countries. As emerging economies compete for positions as regional hubs, they have built relationships not only with developed countries but also with other developing countries; moreover, many MNCs have established headquarters in the BRICSAM Emerging Southern powers have significant political and economic influence in these partnerships (they are not relegated to subordinate roles), but most have not moved away from developed country involvement.
In the biofuel sector Brazil has fluctuated between positioning itself as a partner with and as a competitor to the USA. The USA and Brazil are the primary producers of bioethanol. Ethanol in the USA is mainly produced from corn, with production estimated to have doubled between 2002 and 2005. 22 Brazil uses almost half of its sugarcane for bioethanol production. The USA took the position that biofuels are a necessary and positive contribution to the energy sector; Brazil supported this idea, but specified that sugar-based biofuels (its major industry) do not have the same negative impacts as the USA's maize-based fuels. Drawing on recent research that disaggregated biofuels by their feedstock production processes, Brazil and the USA at first vied for position as 'knowledge brokers' to define the terms of the biofuel debates.
23 From an ecological perspective Brazil's arguments in favour of its biofuels were bolstered by research showing that sugarcane-based ethanol differs significantly from corn-based ethanol in its ecological impacts (although, as noted, sugarcane production increases pressure to convert land, which can undermine these advantages). Moreover, the economics of the industries differ substantially, as Brazil removed government subsidies for bioethanol production and (without US import taxes) Brazilian sugarcane-based bioethanol costs less per gallon than US corn-based Beyond collaborating in development (as Brazil does with the USA), developing countries are proving themselves to be reliable and attractive trading partners. While South-South trade and co-operation are unlikely to displace Northern countries completely, as EU countries hesitate, developing countries may provide alternative markets for biofuels, especially as their economic growth leads to increasing energy demands. As seen in the interactions between the USA and Brazil, the debates about biofuels are being used to broker a larger set of international negotiations on trade and global financing. The evidence for novel patterns of investment and trade in the biofuel sector itself is consistent with the prediction that these new South-South relationships will be significant drivers of biofuel production. Given the relatively short history of the industry, this evidence (which will be discussed in the fourth section) is still only anecdotal. To better assess whether biofuel markets are likely to follow these predicted SouthSouth market trajectories, we look to the trends seen in related industries, since we anticipate that similar patterns will be observed across sectors. The next section therefore provides a brief case study of Indonesia's oil palm industry: as a commodity that is in high demand in the food industry-and that also has potential as a high-yielding feedstock for biodiesel-this example provides suggestive evidence for concern about the environmental impacts of biofuel production in some developing countries.
An Indonesian case study: environmental effects of oil palm plantations
A few states dominate biofuel production, with the USA and Brazil accounting for more than 70% of global bioethanol, 27 and the EU for over 60% of the world's biodiesel (see Table 1 positions itself to increase palm oil biodiesel production and potentially become a significant contributor to global supplies.
Currently, of the over 28 million tonnes of palm oil produced annually from the high-yielding oil palm (Elaeis guineensis Jacq), the majority is used in the food industry, with 90% being used for food-related products in the early 2000s. 28 Indonesia and Malaysia have been the world's largest producers of palm oil since the 1970s. Although the sector slowed in Indonesia in the late 1990s, with a drop in palm oil prices, the Asian financial crisis, and extensive forest fires on the outer islands in 1997-98, it has since regained momentum. In 2004 production of oil palm products represented 1.7% of Indonesia's gross national income, with palm oil exports worth $4.1
billion. 29

Environmental costs of palm oil
While palm oil production tends to involve substantial chemical fertiliser and pesticide inputs, the primary ecological impact from palm comes less from the active management of oil palm plantations than from their creation, which displaces other agricultural activities or causes deforestation. 30
In Indonesia oil palm plantations add to the threats to forests from timber harvesting, especially in Borneo's dipterocarp forests. 31 Indonesia has about 8% of the world's remaining tropical forests, representing about three-quarters of Southeast Asia's remaining primary forest. About one-fifth of Indonesia's forests are under some form of national protection. 32 However, Indonesia's forestry sector has a history of pervasive corruption, weak regulation and poor enforcement. Illegal logging expanded after the fall of President Suharto in 1998 and, in many so-called protected areas, logging and land conversion activities threaten the rainforestsincluding the wildlife they support, like Sumatran orangutans-particularly as so many timber concessions are now stripped of harvestable timber. 33
Concerns about replacing primary forest with palm focuses not only on forest and habitat loss, but also on the carbon emissions associated with logging, particularly from the peat soils that are most valuable for oil palm plantations. Forest degradation was a significant cause of the massive forest fires of 1997-98 in Indonesia; forest cover loss also increases the risk of peat fires. In terms of carbon dioxide and methane emissions, the net impact of conversion to biodiesel could be negative if more greenhouse gases are released in the creation of plantations than are offset by their use as a fossil fuel substitute.
Government policies and funding from international institutions already support the expansion of palm plantations for food production and-even though the plantations themselves are outside protected areas-by replacing lowland forests, they shift pressure from these lowland forest buffer zones to the protected areas. The constraints of limited capital, low technology levels and problems with land acquisition have slowed plantation expansion, but incentives to develop oil palm for biodiesel will help to overcome these barriers, and will compound the pressure on remaining primary forests. 34
Positive steps in changing the environmental damage from oil palm can be seen in the creation of the 
Global markets and the rise of the South
As mentioned, the EU, largely thanks to Germany, is currently the world's leading biodiesel producer. EU countries are responsible for 80% of the world's biodiesel consumption and production. 36 However, Indonesia, by developing its oil palm sector, could assume a significant position in this global market. Indonesia is in a similar place to Brazil in relation to a major Northern producer of biofuels, with the USA as Brazil's competitor (and now partner) and the EU as Indonesia's competitor.
The current scale of production and potential market for biofuels provides a strong incentive for a country like Indonesia to expand its biofuel industry. Some analysts project that by 2014 annual bioethanol production could reach 27 000 million gallons and biodiesel could reach 3900 million gallons. 37 In terms of domestic financing, support for biofuels in the USA has been estimated at between $6.3 and $7.7 billion in 2007, and in OECD countries economic expenditures on biofuel subsidies were estimated to be at least $11 billion in 2006. 38 In 2000 3.2 million hectares were planted with palm oil, mainly in Sumatra, and predominantly (although not exclusively) operated by Indonesian companies; by 2002 oil palm had expanded to just over 3.5 million hectares, with foreign companies-mainly Malaysian-owning over 600 000 hectares. 39 By 2004 the major buyers of palm products came from the developed world, including the US companies Cargill (which both owns a plantation in Sumatra and buys from several plantations) and Archer Daniels Midland, the British company Cadbury Schweppes, and the Australian company Gardner Smith. 40 An increasing number of Malaysian companies, however, were also operating plantations. Moreover, with investment chains and ownership increasingly interlinked, the origins of corporations are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish.
The destinations of palm oil exports also illustrate the increasing prominence of developing country markets. By 2000 India and China had become major export markets and in 2003 and 2004 had taken the lead spots as importers of palm oil. 41 Even though, as noted, palm oil is not yet a major contributor to biodiesel production, its potential to enter the biofuel market is high.
Rising demand for biofuel in Brazil, China and India could therefore reinforce the alreadyexisting markets for Indonesia's palm oil. Nevertheless, Indonesia's oil palm sector remains plagued by uncertainty. The prices of palm oil have been highly variable: for example, in July 2008 Malaysian palm oil prices fell more than 19% over a three-week period. Lower prices for biofuels and uncertainty in biofuel markets led Indonesia's state oil firm, Pertamina, to reduce the biofuel component in its diesel blends from 5% in 2006, to 2.5% in 2007, to 1% in April 2008. Such uncertainty means that predicting the environmental and political relationships that will emerge is a difficult task. Overall, however, given the patterns to date in the demand for palm oil and the projected increased demand for energy from rapidly growing and powerful developing countries, we anticipate that the total demand for oil palm is likely to increase and its production is likely to continue along observed lines.
The next section draws together the arguments about North-South partnerships, increasing South-South co-operation and trade and the projected environmental impact of an increased demand for biofuel feedstocks like palm oil. We contend that, despite sustainability requirements from EU consumers, biofuels look set to threaten vulnerable ecosystems like tropical forests in Indonesia as Northern biofuel producers like the USA lend support to developing country producers, and growing energy demands in the global South provide a market for these biofuels.
The false divide: repeated patterns in new language
While biofuels are integrating agricultural and energy industries and opening new roles for some countries in the global economy, the global political dynamics that they reveal are less novel. As a leader in biofuel technology, Brazil is championing the continued development and promotion of biofuels as a way to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, provide sustainable options for farmers and ensure energy security. However, Brazil's partnership with the USA and its investments in biofuels in Mozambique, Angola and Senegal indicate more than just commitment to biofuels themselves: they reveal the new dynamics of profit-driven investments of the emerging economies of the global South.
The dynamics that we see with biofuels appear likely to mimic the patterns that others have observed in the palm oil industry, with the emerging economies of the South integrating their economies with Northern countries and MNCs, in complex relationships that blur the lines between donors and recipients of aid, and producers and consumers of goods. Promoting these unsustainable resource-based industries casts environmental costs onto lower-income developing countries, and undermines the potential for renewable energy to promote both their economic and environmental well-being.
Although the evidence in biofuel development to date is anecdotal and globally dispersed, in light of established patterns of growth of South-South trade and of the past trends of environmentally destructive resource exploitation by developing countries for both First and Third World consumers, there is reason to anticipate that future development of biofuels will look similar to these past patterns. We look, with concerned interest, at the emerging investment by powerful developing country biofuel leaders-like India and Brazil-in developing country producers.
Global integration of markets and MNCs
The mix of players investing in biofuels ranges from governments to Northern-based MNCs to Southern domestic companies; as a result, the ownership and investment chains can become difficult to track. India has expressed interest in land purchases in Indonesia and Suriname for feedstock production and is seeking funding from a UK private equity firm; investors from South Korea are interested in palm oil plantations in Indonesia; and a Singaporean company is also looking to other Asian countries for feedstock supplies. Some of these examples involve developed country partners, but many involve investment by emerging economies in other developing countries.
African biofuel development is also surging ahead, marked by similar dynamics. A consortium of partners, including several Nigerian banks, the African Development Bank, and a state university of the Philippines, has developed a biofuel refinery project in Nigeria (approved by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation). Mozambique, a current hotspot of biofuel interest, has also become global in its biofuel partnerships, with collaborators and investors that include the Brazilian Petrobras, the Italian ENI, the Central African Mining and Exploration Company, South Africa, and Canada's Energem Resources.
MNCs are active not only in trade relations with developing countries but also in policy advocacy in developed countries. In July 2008 Archer Daniels Midland, DuPont, Deere & Co and Monsanto established the Alliance for Abundant Food and Energy to lobby the US government to promote biofuels. These four companies span the production chain of agriculture, representing interests in agrochemical, farm equipment and seed supplies, as well as purchasing and processing of agricultural outputs, and thereby highlight the integration of the shifting of environmental costs by energy, industrial and agricultural firms. 43
Changing South-South political economy of the environment The development of biofuels, then, is shifting from Northern versus Southern producers to more complicated relationships involving partnerships of developed and emerging developing countries focused on assisting poorer developing countries. Ecological costs are not solely imposed by developed countries onto developing countries, but instead criss-cross the globe as Southern economies integrate more and more into the global economy. In short, the global biofuel industry vividly illustrates the nature of the global economy, involving a changing South-South political economy of the environment, in which states and firms in the South are major consumers as well as producers. Despite some benefits, these South-South relations are interacting with North-South ones in ways that are not necessarily positive for alleviating poverty or promoting environmentally-sound activities.
Conclusion: the ecology of South-South economics
Shifting patterns of trade and economic growth are creating opportunities for more powerful developing countries to invest in less powerful ones and share in the economic influence that developed countries have in the South. This is seen in the increasing influence wielded by developing countries over the direction of agricultural and energy production, a trend reinforced by their rapidly growing populations and energy demands. This is particularly the case for biofuels. Europe's more precautionary approach following the controversy and uncertainty after the food crisis beginning in 2007 has opened up space for biofuel partnerships between countries like the USA and Brazil, which are surging ahead with investment in the global South. It is tempting to hope the participation of developing countries as sponsors and promoters will allow other developing countries to pursue more ecologically sound development: reducing greenhouse gas emissions, supporting small-scale farmers, and using marginal and degraded lands for productive purposes. It is equally tempting to hope both NorthSouth and South-South investments in biofuels could help the Third World-in the language of economists-to tunnel through the Environmental Kuznets Curve and fuel development with carbon-neutral fuels instead of oil, coal and natural gas. The role of emerging second generation biofuels from non-food crops could mitigate some of the concerns about food being diverted to fuel, and could relieve some of the land-use conversion pressures.
Yet this seems unlikely. The technologies for large-scale production and use of secondgeneration fuels are still in development, and so these feedstocks are not yet integrated into the major biofuel markets. Moreover, although using crop waste, non-food crops and marginal lands for biofuel feedstock production can skirt some of the concerns about land conversion and food security, there may still be unintended negative effects of their production-for example, the designation of marginal lands in such a way that threatens small-scale food production by families with uncertain or unrecognised land tenure rights, or the loss of cover crops and crop residue that provide nutrients to the soil and reduce the need for fertiliser inputs.
Some potential does exist for South-South co-operation to support research and develop secondgeneration biofuels (for example, algae-based fuels), which in turn could open new markets and economic opportunities, as well as enhance energy security. Some potential also exists for more profits to remain in the Third World. Yet, overall, our analysis of current trends suggests that this potential is largely lost as the South-South political economy of biofuels repeats and reinforces existing environmentally exploitative and destructive patterns observed with other resources (like timber and oil palm). With new consumer countries willing to accept products without sustainability guarantees, governments unable or unwilling to enforce environmental regulations, and corporate interests becoming further entrenched, biofuels seem poised to lead to even more degradation of vulnerable ecosystems in some of the world's poorest places.
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